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ABSTRACT
European Union countries offer a unique experience of financial regulatory 
and supervisory integration, complementing various other European 
integration efforts following the second world war. Financial regulatory 
and supervisory integration was a very slow process before 2008, despite 
significant cross-border integration especially of wholesale financial markets. 
However, the policy framework proved inadequate in the context of the major 
financial crisis in the EU starting in 2007, and especially in the euro area after 
2010. That crisis triggered major changes to European financial regulation and 
to the financial supervisory architecture, most prominently with the creation 
of three new European supervisory authorities in 2011 and the gradual 
establishment of European banking union starting in 2012. The banking 
union is a major structural institutional change for the EU, arguably the 
most significant since the introduction of the euro. Even in its current highly 
incomplete form, and with no prospects for rapid completion, the banking 
union has improved financial supervision in the euro area and increased the 
euro area’s resilience. Asian financial integration lags well behind Europe, 
and there is no comparable political and legal integration. Nevertheless, Asia 
can draw useful lessons from European experiences in multiple areas that 
include the harmonisation of the micro-prudential framework, proper macro-
prudential structures, and participation in global financial authorities.
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1. Introduction 
European Union (EU) countries offer a unique experience of integration among sovereign 
nations, including regulatory and institutional integration of financial services. Driven by the 
desire to bring peace, security, stability, prosperity and cohesion for their citizens after two 
devastating world wars, a growing number of European countries decided to pool sovereignty to 
an increasing extent. Starting with the 1952 establishment of the European Coal and Steel 
Community by six founding members, various policy areas were integrated throughout the 
subsequent decades, leading to the current European Union with 28 members1. A major step in 
the process was monetary integration with the introduction of a common currency, the euro, in 
eleven countries in 1999, with eight additional countries joining between 2001 and 2015.  
Financial integration of European economies started with growing trade integration, various 
financial regulatory initiatives from the late 1970s and the scrapping of capital controls by 
participating European nations from the late 1980s. While financial integration made progress, 
financial supervisory and regulatory institutions remained national, with limited efforts to 
cooperate and share information. Even monetary unification in 1999 was not accompanied by 
the establishment of supra-national institutions for financial supervision and resolution, even 
though there was a clear logic for it (Folkerts-Landau and Garber, 1992; Schoenmaker, 1997).  
While robust financial supervisory integration did not appear politically feasible in economically 
good times, the euro-area crisis that intensified after the great financial crisis of 2007-09 made 
such a move the most palatable option to preserve the integrity of the euro area and to restore 
financial stability. There were deeper roots to the euro-area crisis, which, most likely, would 
have materialised even without the turmoil that came from the US subprime market (Darvas, 
2012). But the transatlantic financial disruption of 2007-09 created an uncertain global 
environment, weakened all European economies (even those that had comparatively 
sustainable economic models) and led to an acute financial and sovereign crisis in the euro area. 
While some institutional developments for improved cross-border supervision of financial 
services in the EU as a whole were decided in 2009, shortly after the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
in 2008, and implemented in 2011, the biggest institutional development was the establishment 
of the European banking union (BU) for euro-area countries (Véron, 2015). Euro-area heads of 
state and government decided at a summit on 28-29 June 2012 to establish the banking union, at 
the height of the euro-area crisis. The banking union created a truly supranational arrangement 
for banking supervision, centred on the European Central Bank, which in November 2014 
officially assumed supervisory authority over all banks in the euro area, with operational 
                                                          
1 Although the UK vote to leave the EU on 23 June 2016, 'Brexit' has not happened yet. It is not certain that it will 
happen, even though it appears likely. If it does, its eventual form is not clear enough to be included in the analysis 
developed in this paper.  
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delegation to national authorities for the supervision of smaller banks. This centralisation of 
bank supervision was followed by new arrangements for bank resolution, which have been 
mostly in place since January 2016. Additionally, a euro-area-wide common deposit insurance 
system is currently under discussion. A number of other initiatives for the financial sector are 
also being considered, under the umbrella framework known as Capital markets union (CMU), 
even though current CMU reforms do not involve changes to the financial architecture (Véron, 
2016) and therefore are not described in any depth in this paper.  
The goals of this paper are to review recent developments in the EU’s financial supervisory and 
regulatory architecture, to assess its strengths and weaknesses, to draw out lessons for regional 
financial regulatory architecture in Asia, and to highlight ways in which Asian financial 
regulatory and supervisory cooperation could be strengthened and improved. While the focus of 
the paper is on the EU's financial supervisory and regulatory architecture, this must be put into 
the broader context of various regulatory initiatives that are intended to make European 
financial institutions and markets more stable, resilient and supportive of economic 
development. 
To this end, section 2 reviews pre-crisis European financial regulatory initiatives and the 
resulting institutional architecture. Section 3 reviews recent developments in the EU’s financial 
supervisory and regulatory architecture, and also identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the 
current financial architecture and assesses proposed changes to it. Section 4 compares financial 
integration in Asia and in Europe, and highlights relevant implications for regional financial 
regulatory and supervisory cooperation. Finally, section 5 identifies selected lessons from the EU 
developments for the regional financial regulatory and supervisory architecture in Asia, and 
makes recommendations on how Asian financial regulatory and supervisory cooperation could 
be strengthened and improved. 
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2. The pre-crisis financial landscape in Europe 
2.1 Early financial regulatory milestones 
A number of prominent European-level financial services laws have shaped the financial 
landscape in Europe2:  
(i) the First Banking Directive (77/780/EEC, December 1977) provided a single definition 
of credit institutions and outlined principles of non-discrimination to enable 
establishment of cross-border branches;  
(ii) the Second Banking Directive (89/646/EEC, December 1989) harmonised bank 
authorisation rules, stipulated capital requirements, and allowed banks licensed in an 
EU country to lend through branches throughout the EU that would be subject to home-
country authority for most purposes (exceptions cover liquidity regulation and 
oversight, monetary policy, and reporting requirements);  
(iii) the Investment Services Directive (93/22/EEC, May 1993) introduced a 'European 
passport' (dismantling existing legislative barriers to cross-border activity), harmonised 
capital requirements for investment banking firms, and included specific provisions for 
stock exchanges and other regulated markets.  
(iv) the Financial Services Action Plan, FSAP (communication from the Commission 
COM(1999)232, May 1999), was a comprehensive reform programme that led to, among 
other initiatives:  
A. the Regulation on international accounting standards (EC 1606/2002, July 2002), 
which paved the way for adoption and implementation of International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) in the EU;  
B. the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, known as MiFID (2004/39/EC, April 
2004), which built on the 1993 Investment Services Directive to establish the legal 
basis for EU-wide competition between trading platforms and replaced the former 
national stock exchange monopolies;  
C. the first Capital Requirements Directive – CRD (actually two separate texts, 
2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, June 2006) transposing the Basel 2 accord of 2004 into 
European legislation;  
D. the Solvency 2 Directive (2009/138/EC, November 2009 – but started long before 
the start of the global financial crisis) creating a comparable regulatory framework 
for insurance and reinsurance companies.  
                                                          
2 See Rodriguez (1994) for more details on the first three items. See OEE Etudes (2009) for details on the 
fourth item, the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP). 
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2.2 The 'Lamfalussy' financial regulatory and supervisory architecture 
While financial supervision remained exclusively national while the above-listed efforts at 
financial regulatory harmonisation were being implemented, some efforts were made to 
improve coordination among national supervisory authorities. In 2001, a high-level group 
headed by former central banker Alexandre Lamfalussy delivered a report (European 
Commission, 2001) that provided the basis for the so-called 'Lamfalussy process', implemented 
in 2001 for securities and markets regulation and in 2004 for banking and insurance supervision. 
The goals were to adapt financial regulation to allow a higher level of financial integration and to 
adapt it to market developments. The Council of the European Union (or ‘Council’)3 agreed on 
the need to provide convergent regulation and supervision standards. This framework involved 
four levels of decision-making4: 
1. Level 1: principles-based legislation, setting broad legislative principles and addressing 
the issues that are to be decided by the European Parliament5 and the Council under the 
EU legislative procedure known as co-decision (“'ordinary legislative procedure'”). 
2. Level 2: implementing legislation, in the form of technical implementing measures that 
should be aimed at ensuring a high degree of harmonisation and flexibility in the 
regulatory framework. To draft the technical implementing details set forth broadly in 
the Level-1 legislation, the European Securities Committee (ESC) was created, with a 
primarily regulatory function under Art. 202 of the EU Treaty. Additionally, the 
Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), a Level-3 committee (see below), 
had an advisory function at Level 2, in addition to its role of coordinating the 
implementation of EU securities regulation at Level 3. Similar bodies were later created 
for banking and insurance supervision (see below).  
3. Level 3: regulatory and supervisory coordination, focused on a greater level of co-
operation between national supervisors. Three so-called Level-3 committees of national 
authorities were created to facilitate such coordination: the Committee of European 
Securities Regulators (CESR), the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), 
and the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors 
(CEIOPS). Each of these Level-3 committees relied on a small secretariat, respectively 
located in Paris for CESR, London for CEBS, and Frankfurt for CEIOPS. The committees 
comprised the relevant national authorities (including central banks in the case of CEBS) 
                                                          
3 The Council of the European Union (‘Council’ for short) is composed of the relevant ministers of EU 
member states – finance ministers in the case of financial regulatory decisions. Confusingly, the ‘Council’ 
is a separate arrangement from the ‘European Council’, which includes the head of state or government of 
each EU member state, the European Council President and the President of the European Commission. 
See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/home/.  
4 See a diagram summarising these four levels on page 6 of the Lamfalussy committee final report 
(European Commission, 2001). 
5 Members of the European Parliament are elected by EU citizens every fifth year. 
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of all EU countries, observers from the European Economic Area (Iceland, Liechtenstein 
and Norway) and the European Commission in CESR and CEIOPS and the European 
Central Bank in CEBS (with the European Commission having observer status). 
4. Level 4: control of compliance and enforcement, intended to ensure greater enforcement 
of EU laws, with the main role being played by the European Commission as the 
guardian of the treaties. 
 
These tangled arrangements highlight the hybrid role of the European Commission, which 
combines executive, legislative, political and administrative features. The Commission’s role in 
the regulation of financial markets includes preparation of EU legislative proposals for the 
European Parliament and Council, and participation in discussions about legislative proposals 
between EU member states, European institutions and other relevant stakeholders.  
Moreover, the European Commission is the competent authority in enforcing the EU’s 
competition policy framework for major cases with cross-border impact, while national 
competition authorities have jurisdiction over local cases (for example mergers of domestic 
companies with no international activity). Competition policy has become a very important part 
of the EU financial policy framework, especially (but not only) through the EU's mandate to 
check state aid. Since 1999, a string of landmark decisions by the European Commission to 
enforce competition policy rules in the financial sector, and in particular to allow the cross-
border acquisitions of financial institutions that domestic authorities tried to prevent, has played 
a crucial role in ensuring the integrity of the EU’s single market and in fostering cross-border 
financial integration. 
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3. Recent changes to the EU’s financial supervisory and regulatory architecture 
3.1 Changes to the European supervisory architecture, 2009-11 
3.1.1 Micro-prudential supervision: the European Supervisory Authorities 
The recent changes to the EU’s financial architecture were prompted by the great financial crisis 
of 2007-09 and the subsequent euro crisis of 2010-12. In October 2008, the European 
Commission appointed a group chaired by former managing director of the International 
Monetary Fund, Jacques de Larosière, to give advice on the future of European financial 
regulation and supervision. The resulting de Larosière Report (2009) concluded that the 
supervisory framework needed to be strengthened to reduce the risk and severity of future 
financial crises. It recommended creating three European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs): one 
for the banking sector (European Banking Authority, EBA), one for the securities sector 
(European Securities and Markets Authority, ESMA), and one for the insurance and 
occupational pensions sector (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, 
EIOPA). These three new ESAs replaced the Lamfalussy Level-3 committees (CESR, CEBS, 
CEIOPS) and were established in the same locations (respectively Paris, London and Frankfurt). 
The de Larosière Report also recommended establishing a European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB), to monitor and to assess potential threats to financial stability that arise from macro-
economic developments and from developments within the financial system as a whole (see 
details in the next section).  
The underlying rationale for setting up the ESAs was to ensure closer cooperation and better 
exchange of information between national supervisors, to facilitate the adoption of EU 
resolutions to cross-border problems, and to advance the coherent interpretation and 
application of rules (De Haan, et al, 2015). By preparing uniform standards and ensuring 
supervisory convergence and coordination, the ESAs were intended to shape the further 
development of a 'single rulebook' applicable to all 28 EU countries and thus contribute to the 
single market. The three ESAs and the ESRB started their operations in January 2011. 
The powers assigned to the ESAs include the following: 
• developing draft technical standards, guidance and recommendations; 
• resolving cases of disagreement between national supervisors, where legislation requires 
them to co-operate or to agree; 
• contributing to ensuring the consistent application of technical rules of EU law, including 
through peer reviews, and 
• a coordination and enforcement role in emergency situations.  
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The de Larosière report envisaged a European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) that 
would comprise the three ESAs, a joint committee to coordinate them, the ESRB, and all 
participating national authorities. The ESFS would foster the replacement of the EU’s 
hodgepodge of partially harmonised national financial-sector regulations with a genuine single 
rulebook. Figure 1 illustrates the functioning of the three ESAs, highlighting that they work 
closely with the national supervisory authorities. As such, this network combines nationally-
based supervision of firms with coordination at the European level to foster harmonised rules, 
coherent supervisory practices and enforcement. Through the joint committee, the three ESAs 
cooperate and ensure consistency in their practices. Therefore, while the three ESAs are not 
supervisors as the name 'European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs)' misleadingly suggests 
(except ESMA’s direct supervisory role discussed below), they contribute more effectively to the 
consistency of European supervisory practices than the previous Level-3 committees of the 
Lamfalussy framework (CESR, CEBS, CEIOPS) could.  
In addition to this indirect supervisory impact, ESMA also exercises direct supervisory authority 
over a limited set of regulated financial firms with a pan-European profile, namely credit rating 
agencies and trade repositories. This direct supervisory role may be expanded in the future 
towards other market segments, such as financial market utilities, but there are no current plans 
to do so. 
 
Figure 1: The European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) work closely with national 
supervisory authorities (NSAs) 
 
Source: De Haan, Oosterloo and Schoenmaker (2015) 
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3.1.2 Macro-prudential supervision 
One of the main lessons from the 2007–09 global financial crisis was that the supervisory 
arrangements then in place  over-emphasised the supervision of individual firms, and under-
emphasised the supervision of the financial system as a whole (macro-prudential supervision) 
(De Haan et al, 2015). The interconnections between institutions might lead to system-wide risks 
that are not internalised by them. Financial institutions have correlated balance sheets resulting 
from the similarity of their asset portfolios, because of the interconnectedness within networks 
that creates the potential for quick contagion, and because of the potential fire sale of assets that 
can take place during stress episodes (Claeys and Darvas, 2015). 
Macro-prudential policy could play a key role in ensuring system-wide stability, by increasing 
the resilience of the financial system and by taming the financial cycle with targeted tools. More 
specifically, Smets (2014) suggested that macro-prudential policy should have four intermediate 
targets:  
1. mitigate and prevent excessive credit growth and leverage,  
2. mitigate and prevent excessive maturity and liquidity mismatch,  
3. limit excessive exposure concentrations, and 
4. limit bail-out expectations. 
Blanchard et al (2013) suggests that macro-prudential tools can be roughly divided into three 
main categories: 
• tools seeking to influence lenders’ behaviour, such as time-varying capital requirements, 
leverage ratios or dynamic provisioning,  
• tool focusing on borrowers’ behaviour, such as ceilings on loan-to-value ratios (LTVs) or 
on debt-to-income ratios (DTIs), 
• capital controls, known as 'capital flow management tools', that target 'hot money' flows.  
While macro-prudential policies are relatively new and mainly under construction, the recent 
literature assessing these measures has found some encouraging results. In particular, a number 
of papers show that carefully set limits to ratios such as the LTV and the DTI could help to tame 
financial imbalances6. 
A major advantage of these tools is that they can be applied to a particular sector affected by 
financial imbalances, for instance the real-estate sector. In the euro-area context, these tools 
                                                          
6 See, for example, Borio and Shim (2007), Lim et al (2011), Igan and Kang (2011), Jiménez et al (2012), 
Kim (2013), Cerutti et al (2015), and Kuttner and Shim (2016). 
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have the additional advantage that they can be tailored to country-specific circumstances, while 
the ECB’s monetary policy can only consider the euro-area as a whole. 
In order to strengthen supervisory arrangements on both sides of the Atlantic, the EU and US 
authorities established new bodies responsible for macro-prudential supervision, ie the 
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) in the EU and the Financial Stability Oversight Council 
(FSOC) in the US. Moreover, at the global level, G20 leaders in 2009 established the Financial 
Stability Board (FSB) as a successor body to the prior, more limited Financial Stability Forum. 
The ESRB is responsible for the macro-prudential oversight of the EU’s financial system, defined 
as contributing to the prevention or mitigation of systemic risks that arise from developments 
within the financial system and taking into account macroeconomic developments, in order to 
avoid periods of widespread financial distress. 
The ESRB comprises a General Board as its decision-making body, a Steering Committee which 
sets the agenda and prepares the decisions, a secretariat and an Advisory Technical Committee 
and an Advisory Scientific Committee. While all relevant stakeholders are represented within the 
ESRB, a prominent role has been granted to central banks, ie the majority of the voting members 
of the General Board are central bank representatives, the chair is the ECB President, and the 
ECB also provides the secretariat along with analytical, statistical, administrative and logistical 
support to the ESRB. 
The ESRB's tasks include: 
1. the collection and analysis of all information relevant for macro-prudential oversight; 
2. the identification and prioritisation of systemic risks; 
3. the issuance of warnings where such risks are deemed to be significant; 
4. the issuance of recommendations for remedial action;monitoring of measures taken in 
response to warnings and recommendations; 
5. cooperation with the ESAs, including the development of indicators of systemic risk and 
the conduct of stress-testing exercises; 
6. the issuance of confidential warnings on emergency situations addressed to the 
European Council; and 
7. coordination with the IMF, he FSB and other macro-prudential bodies. 
 
Although ESRB recommendations are not binding, the parties addressed are obliged to respond 
under the principle of ‘comply or explain’. In other words, they must follow the 
recommendation, or explain why they are not doing so. 
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3.2 The establishment of the European banking union  
3.2.1 Rationale 
The notion of a banking union explicitly appeared on the EU policy agenda only in the first half 
of 2012, following numerous earlier calls by economists and analysts (see eg Véron, 2011). At 
that time, the intensification of the euro-area crisis necessitated bold measures to counter the 
increasing market pressure being felt by several interlinked banks and euro-area sovereigns, and 
the increasing financial fragmentation, which created a risk of major negative impacts on the 
economy of the euro-area and beyond. Several observers questioned whether the euro would 
survive the crisis. In this disorderly environment, the idea of a banking union offered a politically 
more acceptable option compared to other alternatives, such as the issuance of Eurobonds 
(joint and several liabilities of euro-area member states) and a more rapid move towards a full-
fledged fiscal union. The European Council of 28-29 June 2012 marked the start of Europe’s 
banking union (the expression itself became widely used in the spring of 2012, but was endorsed 
by the European Council only later in 2013), most consequentially by deciding to shift bank 
supervisory authority from the national to the European level, under a framework labelled the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), also known as European Banking Supervision. 
The explicit motivation for this landmark decision was to “break the vicious circle between banks 
and sovereigns.” National bank resolution regimes and the home-country bias in banks’ 
government-bond holdings imply that there is a correlation between banking and sovereign 
debt crises, which in the euro area context became increasingly disruptive. When a government 
gets into trouble, so does the country's banking system (eg Greece). And a failing banking system 
can worsen the government’s budget because of a potential government financed bank bailout, 
which comes on top of a higher budget deficit resulting from the economic downturn caused by 
the banking crisis (eg Ireland or Spain).  
Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012) documented that most euro-area countries were characterised 
by the large size of their banks’ portfolios of domestic government bonds, which were markedly 
larger than in the United Kingdom or the US. Moreover, during the crisis this vulnerability 
increased, because all vulnerable countries saw a decline in the share of government debt held 
by non-residents. Germany, by contrast, saw an increase in the share held by non-residents.  
This lethal correlation between banks and sovereigns, or ‘doom-loop’ or ‘vicious circle’ as it is 
frequently referred to, was a key reason for the initiation of the banking union. The 29 June 2012 
Euro Area Summit statement started with the words: “We affirm that it is imperative to break the 
vicious circle between banks and sovereigns.” 
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At a more fundamental level, the creation of the banking union was a response to the mismatch 
between the integrated European banking market and the largely national sector-specific 
banking policies, including for prudential supervision and crisis management. The combination 
of cross-border banking and national supervision and resolution leads to coordination failure 
between national authorities, which (understandably) put national interests first. This in turn 
can undermine fair competition between banks in different countries, lead to sub-optimal 
resolution decisions, and might put financial stability at risk. Completion of the banking union 
would solve this coordination failure through the adoption of supranational banking policies. 
The coordination failure argument is related to the single EU market (which allows 
unconstrained cross-border banking), and thus to the European Union as a whole, beyond the 
euro area (Schoenmaker, 2015; Véron, 2015). 
Consistent with this pan-EU rationale, the legislation establishing the banking union (described 
below) left the door open for non-euro area EU members to join without adopting the euro as 
their currency (ie without joining the euro area). Thereby, the coordination failure problem 
could be addressed in the EU as a whole, should non-euro area members decide to join the 
banking union through the process referred to in that legislation as “close cooperation”. Since the 
banking systems of most non-euro area EU countries are highly integrated with the euro-area 
banking system, entering the banking union could be beneficial for those countries. It could 
improve the supervision of cross-border banks, ensure greater consistency of supervisory 
practices and provide ample supervisory information, thereby increasing the quality of 
supervision, avoiding competitive distortions and fostering financial integration (Darvas and 
Wolff, 2013; Hüttl and Schoenmaker, 2016). Figure 2 shows that in most non-euro EU members, 
a very large share of domestic banking assets are owned by subsidiaries and branches of EU 
banks, which are predominantly euro-area banks.  
Figure 2: Share of total bank assets from foreign-owned branches and subsidiaries, 2015 
 
Source: Bruegel using data from the European Central Bank. Note: countries marked with an 
asterisk (*) are current members of the euro area. 
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A simplified but widespread descriptive framework holds that a complete banking union should 
be composed of the following elements: 
1. Uniform regulation, including detailed technical standards ('single rulebook'); 
2. A single mechanism for bank supervision; 
3. A single mechanism for bank resolution; 
4. A single deposit insurance scheme; and 
5. A common fiscal backstop for bank resolution and deposit insurance. 
Such a system is intended to address the bank-sovereign vicious circle the following ways.  
1. Regulation would (1) make creditor participation in bank resolution ('bail-in') the rule, 
leaving public sector support ('bail-out') to unusual and extraordinary occasions, 
thereby reducing the potential cost of banking crises to the taxpayer, and (2) set limits on 
bank holdings of domestic government bonds, thereby reducing the channels through 
which a sovereign debt crisis can spread to a banking crisis. 
2. Consistent supervision would improve the quality of banking oversight and thereby 
reduce the probability of bank failures, on the basis that national supervisors tend to be 
more lenient with domestic banks than supranational banks (Véron, 2015).  
3. Consistent resolution would reduce cross-country coordination failures, make 
resolution more effective, and better enforce the common rules than in a purely national 
framework.  
4. A common deposit guarantee would increase trust in bank deposits, thereby reducing 
bank funding costs and the probability of bank runs, and thus enhancing financial 
stability. 
5. Systemic banking crises cannot be completely excluded, even though their probability 
can be reduced by strict regulation and supervision. Moreover, even under an effective 
resolution system and strong bail-in rules, the need for public sector support cannot be 
fully excluded. But if public sector bank recapitalisation or a top-up to the national 
deposit guarantee fund, when needed, would be financed by the domestic government, 
then banking woes could spread to the public sector, thus reviving the bank-sovereign 
vicious circle. In contrast, if a common fund steps in under such situations, then the 
costs are spread across the banking union area ('risk sharing') and the spectre of banking 
troubles spreading to domestic public finances is significantly reduced. A final element is 
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thus a centralised fiscal backstop to the common fund. Deposit insurance funds typically 
have a credit line from the government (Gros and Schoenmaker, 2014)7. 
Furthermore, a consistent and rigorously implemented system involving these five aspects 
might also change bank behaviour by limiting undue risk-taking and bail-out expectations, 
thereby reducing the risk of bank failures. 
 
3.2.2 The current architecture of the banking union 
In contrast to the above-described complete banking union, the current architecture is 
incomplete. It can be summarily described as nearly complete in terms of regulation and 
supervision (though without the above-suggested sovereign exposure limits), but with a 
lopsided and untested resolution framework, no European-level deposit guarantee, and no 
explicit European-level financial backstop.  
In terms of legislation, the European act for European Banking Supervision (or SSM Regulation) 
was enacted on 15 October 2013 with unanimous support from all EU countries. The Single 
Resolution Mechanism (SRM) Regulation was enacted on 15 July 2014. A proposal for a 
European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) was published by the European Commission on 24 
November 2015, but is still far from being finally adopted. 
The European Central Bank (ECB) assumed supervisory authority on 4 November 2014, when it 
became the single licensing authority for all banks in the euro area and the sole authority to 
approve their changes of ownership and new management. The ECB directly supervises 129 
'significant institutions' – broadly speaking the largest ones, based on criteria set by the SSM 
regulation8 – and oversees the supervision of more than 3,000 'less significant institutions' by 
national supervisors (referred to in the banking union jargon as national competent authorities 
or NCAs). Figure 3 illustrates the framework.  
                                                          
7 Moreover, centralised supervision is consistent with a centralised fiscal backstop: to the extent that the 
centralised supervision is responsible for the bank failure, the costs of such a failure should not be charged 
only to the home country of the bank. 
8 Four criteria are considered for the assessment of whether a financial institution is significant: (1) size (the total 
value of its assets exceeds €30 billion), (2) economic importance (for the specific country or the EU economy as a 
whole, including if it is one of the three most significant banks established in a particular country), (3) cross-border 
activities (the total value of its assets exceeds €5 billion and the ratio of its cross-border assets/liabilities in more than 
one other participating member state to its total assets/liabilities is above 20 percent), and (4) direct public financial 
assistance (it has requested or received funding from the European Stability Mechanism or the European Financial 
Stability Facility). The status of banks may change and the ECB conducts regular reviews of all banks authorised 
within the participating countries. See more information at: 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/list/criteria/html/index.en.html.  
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Figure 3: European banking supervision 
 
Source: Schoenmaker and Véron (2016) 
 
By contrast to the highly centralised scheme adopted for European banking supervision, the 
resolution framework created by the SRM Regulation entails a complex, and as yet entirely 
untested, division of responsibilities between European and national authorities. The SRM 
Regulation established a Single Resolution Board (SRB), with staff located in Brussels, which has 
a central (but far from exclusive) role in resolution decision-making and manages a Single 
Resolution Fund (SRF). Despite its name, the SRF is initially established as a series of national 
'compartments' coexisting with a mutualised fund, and is expected to eventually become 
entirely mutualised among all euro-area member states only after a lengthy transition period 
that runs until 2024. The resolution process is governed by a newly harmonised (and also largely 
untested) legislation that covers the entire EU, not just the euro area, and is known as the Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD)9.  
 
3.3 An early assessment of European banking supervision 
Key provisions of the BRRD and of the SRM Regulation entered into force only in January 2016, 
and at the time of writing, the SRB has not taken any resolution decision, making it too early to 
assess the new European banking resolution framework. By contrast, European banking 
supervision has now been in place for almost two years and can thus be subjected to an early, if 
inevitably tentative, assessment.  
Such an assessment is inevitably constrained by the obvious fact that, while supervisory failures 
can be very visible (and costly), supervisory successes are intrinsically difficult to observe or 
                                                          
9 See at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014L0059  
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interpret. We offer two approaches in this section: one based on the qualitative and narrative 
review of supervisory practices developed in Schoenmaker and Véron (2016), and the other 
based on the observation of quantitative outcomes that bear a connection with supervisory 
processes. Both approaches have limitations, like the dependence of the first approach on 
perceptions, while the banking union in itself is not the sole determinant of the indicators listed 
for the second approach. Yet keeping these limitations in mind, they together provide an 
indication of the strengths and weaknesses of the current form of the banking union.  
 
3.3.1 Bank supervision practices 
Schoenmaker and Véron (2016) assessed the practice of European banking supervision under 
the Single Supervisory Mechanism in its first 18 months of operation, ie from November 2014 to 
May 2016. Based on the detailed chapters discussing the functioning of the SSM in nine 
countries and the editors' overall own analysis, Schoenmaker and Véron (2016) reach the 
following key conclusions10: 
• European banking supervision is effective. Supervision of cross-border banking groups in 
the euro area is conducted in a joined-up manner that contrasts with the previous 
fragmented, country-by-country practice. The key mechanism is the operation of Joint 
Supervisory Teams (JSTs), which for each supervised banking group enable information 
sharing between the ECB and relevant national supervisors while providing a clear line of 
command and decision-making. The size of JSTs (up to several dozen examiners) also allows 
for specialisation on topics such as capital and governance. 
 
• European banking supervision is tough, at least when it comes to significant (larger) 
banks. It is generally more intrusive than previous national regimes, with supplementary 
questions during investigations and more on-site visits. The ECB is less vulnerable to 
regulatory capture and political intervention. An early quantitative indication is that the ECB 
has not shied away from increasing capital requirements by imposing higher capital add-ons 
under its Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP). Fewer changes have been 
introduced so far for the supervision of less significant banks, which still varies significantly 
in different countries but appears generally less demanding than that of significant banks. 
 
• European banking supervision appears to be broadly fair, at least for significant banks. 
Among these, we have not found compelling evidence of country- or institution-specific 
distortions or special treatment by the ECB, for example in the determination of SREP 
                                                          
10 Excerpt from Schoenmaker and Véron (2016). 
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scores. The situation is more complex when it comes to less significant banks that remain 
subject to national supervision, including those tied together in what EU legislation calls 
Institutional Protection Schemes. 
 
• European banking supervision makes mistakes. There have been cases of overlapping and 
redundant data requests. The ECB’s communication on Maximum Distributable Amounts 
was ill-prepared and contributed to volatility on bank equity markets in early 2016. The 
Supervisory Board appears to act as a bottleneck in some procedures and does not optimise 
its use of delegation for day-to-day decisions.  
 
• European banking supervision is insufficiently transparent. The ECB’s Supervisory Board 
and SREP process are seen as black boxes by numerous stakeholders. Banks complain about 
the opacity of the determination of SREP scores, which are based on multiple factors. 
European banking supervision still provides pitifully little public information about all 
supervised banks, in stark contrast to US counterparts.  
 
• European banking supervision has not yet broken the bank-sovereign vicious circle and 
created a genuine single banking market in the euro area. Many lingering obstacles to a 
level playing field are outside European banking supervision’s remit, including deposit 
insurance, macro-prudential decisions (beyond banking) and many other important policy 
instruments that remain at the national level. But even within its present scope of 
responsibility, European banking supervision maintains practices that contribute to cross-
border fragmentation, such as the imposition of entity-level (as opposed to group-level) 
capital and liquidity requirements, or geographical ring-fencing, and the omission of 
geographical risk diversification inside the euro area in stress test scenarios. It has not yet 
put an end to the high home bias towards domestic sovereign debt in many banks’ bond 
portfolios. Nor have many cross-border acquisitions been approved by ECB banking 
supervision so far.  
Developments since June 2016 (when Schoenmaker and Véron, 2016, was published) have not 
materially modified this assessment, but highlight the challenges faced by the ECB in 
maintaining high supervisory standards. In particular, the banking sector fragility in Italy, which 
was mentioned in the June assessment, remains a major concern that the ECB has not yet been 
able to address comprehensively. Despite ongoing market concerns about the sustainability of 
the business model of Deutsche Bank, at the time of writing there is no indication of a failure by 
the ECB in its supervision of that systemically important institution, which is the euro area's 
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third-largest bank by total assets. Nevertheless, choices made by the ECB during the stress 
testing of Deutsche Bank and of several dozen other EU banks in the early summer of 2016 were 
questioned by the media as possibly denoting favourable special treatment11. 
 
3.3.2 Outcomes 
The results of a round of stress testing published in late July 2016 suggest that the banking 
system is much more resilient than in previous years (Table 1). Except for Monte dei Paschi di 
Siena, Italy’s third-largest bank, all banks satisfy Pillar 1 requirements in the adverse scenario. 
 
Table 1: Overall outcome of recent stress tests of European banks 
  CET1 ratio before 
the stress scenario 
(%) 
CET1 ratio stressed 
(%) 
2011 Stress test 8.9* 7.7* 
2014 Stress test 11.1 (9.9) 8.5 (7.6) 
2016 Stress test 13.2 (12.6) 9.4 (9.2) 
Source: European Banking Authority (2016). Notes: Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital ratio: 
in the context of CRD IV, a measure of capital that is predominantly common equity as defined by 
the Capital Requirements Regulation, as a percentage of risk-weighted assets under CRD IV. The 
asterisk indicates CT1 (Core Tier 1) ratio (instead of CET1), which on average is comprised of 95% 
CET1. Fully loaded requirements are in parentheses, which are calculated without applying the 
transitional provisions set out in CRD IV Regulation. All stress tests have a three-year horizon: e.g., 
the 2016 stress test uses 2015 balance sheet data (second column) and reports, among other things, 
the capital position at the end of the adverse scenario, which is 2018 (third column). The same 
holds mutatis mutandis for the other tests. The sample differs across years: the 2011 one had 95 
banks, the 2014 one had 105, and the 2016 one had 51. Pillar 1 requirements: 4.5% CET1, 6% T1, 
and 8% total capital ratio. 
 
The development of credit default swap (CDS) spreads of banks highlight that US and Japanese 
banks were hit by market turmoil much more than euro-area banks in the immediate aftermath 
of the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 (Figure 4). However, while the perceived 
riskiness of US and Japanese banks improved significantly by the second half of 2009, the 
                                                          
11 See Laura Noonan, Caroline Binham and James Shotter, ‘Deutsche Bank received special treatment in EU stress 
tests’, Financial Times, 11 October 2016.  
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pressure on euro-area banks increased from early 2010, reaching especially high levels in Italy 
and Spain in 2011-12. Market pressure declined after the summer of 2012, when European 
leaders initiated the banking union and ECB President Draghi delivered a landmark speech 
promising “to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro”12. The decline in CDS spreads was 
especially marked in the second half of 2013 and the first half of 2014, a decline in which the 
development of the banking union has likely played a role. In 2016 there was significant volatility 
and an increase in CDS spreads, not least because of the troubles of the Italian bank Monte dei 
Paschi di Siena, the only bank that failed the 2016 stress tests (adverse scenario). However, the 
announcement of a capital plan for Monte dei Paschi di Siena improved market sentiment, and 
CDS spreads fell in late July and the first half of August 2016.  
 
Figure 4: Credit default swap (CDS) spreads of top financial corporations, 1 January 2008 – 
10 October 2016 
 
                                                          
12 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html.  
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Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream Professional and Bruegel computations. 
Note: Abbreviations: DE = Germany, ES = Spain, FR = France, IT = Italy. Average of the top five 
banks for each country. The following banks are included: France: BNP Paribas, Credit Agricole, 
Credit Lyonnais, Societe Generale, Natixis; Germany: Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, Bayerische 
Landesbank, Nord LB, Unicredit Bank AG; Italy: Unicredit, Unione di Banche Italiane, Banco 
Popolare, Intensa Sanpaolo, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena; Japan: Aozora Bank, Mizuho 
Bank, the BTMBI; Spain: Banco Santander, BBVA, Banco Popular Espanol, CaixaBank, Caja de 
Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Madrid; UK: HSBC, STD Chartered, Barclays, Lloyds, BK of 
Scotland; US: Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, PNC. 
 
Figure 5 highlights the heterogeneity of the euro area in terms of non-performing loans (NPLs). 
As highlighted by Schoenmaker and Véron (2016), data is based on national NPL definitions that 
may not be fully harmonised. An increase in reported NPLs might signal a deterioration in the 
quality of loans, but might also result from better measurement and curbs on practices variously 
referred to as loan forbearance, ‘evergreening’ or ‘extend-and-pretend’. Nevertheless, Figure 5 
indicates that the share of NPLs is relatively high and rising (or at best, is stable at a high level) in 
Greece, Italy and Portugal, while in Ireland and Spain NPLs have started to fall significantly, 
suggesting that the major restructuring and recapitalisation of their banking systems have 
improved the soundness of banks in these countries. 
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Figure 5: The share of non-performing loans 
 
Source: IMF Financial Soundness Indicators database.  
Note: Note: quarterly data is not available for Ireland and Portugal in 2008 and 2009 and 
Germany for all years: for these years, the corresponding annual data is indicated in each quarter. 
For France and Italy bi-annual data is available.  
 
A key question is whether the core business of traditional banking, supplying the economy with 
credit, has sufficiently resumed. A major problem with the analysis of credit developments in the 
context of banking union is that credit growth is influenced by many factors beyond the 
behaviour of banks, including credit demand, which is strongly impacted by current and 
expected economy activity. In turn, the economic outlook depends on various factors other than 
banking system soundness, such as fiscal, monetary and structural policies, as well as 
developments in the rest of the world. Various monetary policy measures, such as special central 
bank schemes for lending to banks, also influence banks’ ability and willingness to supply credit. 
The availability of alternative sources of finance, such as the substitution of bank loans with debt 
securities, also influences credit developments. Nevertheless, academic research suggests that 
credit supply constraints typically play a major role in weak credit performance during financial 
crises (see Darvas, 2013a, for a survey). Darvas (2013c) concludes that a proper clean-up of the 
banking system is a pre-condition for the resumption of credit growth in the euro area. Bank 
supervision has a major role to play in this bank balance sheet clean-up process. Figures 6-8 
relate to: (1) credit standards as derived from bank lending surveys, (2) actual credit growth, and 
(3) interest rates on bank loans. 
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The panel A of Figure 6 suggests that that credit standards were tightened substantially in the 
euro area, the United States and the United Kingdom in 2007-09, but not in Japan. Subsequently, 
credit standards were eased in early 2009 in the UK and Japan and in late 2010 in the US. In 
contrast, in the euro area, credit standards were tightened again in 2011-13, reflecting the 
difficult position of the euro-area banking sector during the euro crisis. More recently, however, 
credit standards have been eased in the euro area too The banking union has likely played a 
significant role in this easing.  
The panel B of Figure 6 shows the same data for the four largest euro-area countries. Not 
surprisingly, credit standards in 2011-13 were tightened most in Italy and least in Germany, 
while France and Spain are in between. However, starting in the third quarter of 2014, credit 
standards eased significantly in Italy. 
 
Figure 6: Banks’ net tightening of credit standards applied to new loans (weighted net 
percentage of banks), 2003Q1-2016Q3 
A: Global comparison B: Four largest euro-area countries 
  
Source: Bank Lending Surveys from the European Central Bank and national central banks, 
Federal Reserve System (Senior Loan Officer Survey), Bank of England (Credit Conditions Survey), 
Bank of Japan (Senior Loan Officer Survey). 
Note: Data is represented as a weighted net percentage, that is, the percentage of banks reporting 
tightening of lending standards minus those reporting easing credit standards that are applied to 
new loans, weighted by the share of each bank in the total loan outstanding amount. A value of 
zero implies credit standards have not changed from one period to the next. A positive value 
represents tightening credit compared to the previous period and a negative value represents 
easing relative to the previous period. 
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Figure 7 reports credit growth in three country groups within the euro-area: 'core' (Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, Germany and the Netherlands), 'mid' (France and Italy) and 'periphery' 
(Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain). While there are differences within each of these groups, 
there are even greater differences between groups, underlining the heterogeneity of the euro 
area. In ‘core’ and ‘mid’ euro-area countries some credit growth had resumed by late 2014, a 
development in which European banking policies might have played a role. In the ‘periphery’, 
contraction of credit aggregates continued, but at a gradually lower rate.  
Following an unsustainable credit boom, which characterised several euro-area periphery 
countries and led to private debt overhangs, a contraction of aggregate credit stock is a 
phenomenon that leads to more sustainable corporate finances. In these countries, the key issue 
is not the growth rate of the aggregate credit stock, but rather whether the process frequently 
called 'zombification' (see eg Caballero, Takeo and Kashyap, 2008) can be avoided, whereby 
banks with weak balance sheets roll over the dubious loans of their existing clients (instead of 
realising further losses) and do not grant credit to young and potentially more productive firms. 
Overall, the evidence available suggests that some periphery countries may now have escaped 
zombification (especially Ireland and Spain) but others may still be trapped in a 'zombie 
banking' cycle, including Portugal and possibly also Italy.  
 
Figure 7: Bank loans to non-financial corporations, January 2004 – September 2016 (Percent 
change compared to the same month of the previous year) 
 
Source: authors’ calculations using data from the European Central Bank. Note: AT=Austria, 
BE=Belgium, FI=Finland, DE=Germany, NL=the Netherlands, FR=France, IT=Italy, GR=Greece, 
IE=Ireland, PT=Portugal, ES=Spain.  
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For the same three country groups, Figure 8 shows interest rates on loans to non-financial 
corporations. While loan rates were rather uniform across the euro area from 2003-08, the euro-
crisis, which started to intensify in late 2009, was accompanied by a major divergence, whereby 
loan rates especially in the periphery, and to a lesser extent in mid countries, increased to values 
well over the rates in core countries. Both financial fragmentation and the increased risk in the 
periphery countries might have contributed to the interest rate divergence. The recent 
narrowing of the spread relative to core countries is therefore welcome, in which European 
banking policies may also have played a role. 
Figure 8: Interest rate on bank loans to non-financial corporations, January 2003 – 
September 2016 (Percent per year) 
 
Source: authors’ calculations using data from the European Central Bank. Note: see the country 
codes in the note to Figure 7. 
 
Next, we look at an indicator of financial integration in the euro area: bank loans to domestic 
borrowers and borrowers in other euro-area countries (cross-border loans). Figure 9 shows that 
loans granted by euro-area banks to residents in other euro-area countries almost tripled from 
1999 to 2008, whereas loans granted to domestic borrowers grew at a lower rate. Since the crisis, 
however, domestic lending has changed little, whereas intra-euro area lending fell rapidly. 
However, starting from early 2014 the fall in cross-border lending has stopped and a gradual 
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recovery has started, signalling that the financial fragmentation that characterised the crisis 
years may be gradually left behind.  
 
Figure 9: Bank loans to domestic borrowers vs. borrowers in other euro-area countries 
(1999/01 = 100), January 1999 – June 2016 
 
Source: author’s calculation based on data from the European Central Bank. 
 
Lastly, a key issue is whether the banking union was able to lessen the bank-sovereign vicious 
circle, which was the key motivation behind its initiation, as we argued above. Assessment of this 
issue is made difficult by the relatively short time since the inception of the banking union, the 
lack of major sovereign crises and banking failures, but also by the European Central Bank’s 
large scale asset purchases13, which have exerted a downward pressure on sovereign and private 
sector yields.  
Still, it is worthwhile to go through the list of banking union-related factors we put forward in 
Section 3.2.1 which can mitigate the vicious circle: 
1. Regulation: The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) introduces strict rules for 
the bail-in of bank creditors14. These rules, however, have not been fully tested yet. There 
have been attempts to circumvent them (eg in Italy) but it is too early to label them 
                                                          
13 See details about ECB’s asset purchases at:  
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/index.en.html  
14 See Darvas (2013b) for a brief discussion of the bail-out vs bail-in debate. 
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ineffective or even ill-designed. A separate but related regulatory challenge is the current 
high exposure of many (though not all) euro-area banks to their home-country sovereign, 
which evidently reinforces the bank-sovereign vicious circle. Discussions have started on the 
possible limitation of such exposures through appropriate prudential rules, but they raise 
thorny political challenges and are still at a stage that is far from conclusive. Indeed, the large 
home bias in banks’ holdings of debt securities has only marginally declined in Spain and 
Italy and was practically unchanged in Portugal, as indicated by Figure 61 and 63 of Darvas 
et al (2015). 
2. European banking supervision is in place and has improved the quality of banking oversight, 
as argued above. Thereby it reduces the probability of bank failures. Moreover, the ECB 
conducted a comprehensive assessment of the banking system before it formally started its 
supervisory function in October 2014: in anticipation of the results of this assessment, 
several banks increased their capital position, which has contributed to banking sector 
soundness. And as mentioned above, more recent stress tests in 2016 suggested that all 
tested banks (except Monte dei Paschi di Siena) have broadly adequate capital even in an 
adverse scenario, which may be viewed as suggesting that financial resilience has improved. 
All these factors contribute to reducing the probability of a vicious circle originating from 
banking failures. On the other hand, as observed by Schoenmaker and Véron (2016), the 
SSM maintains practices that contribute to cross-border fragmentation, such as the 
imposition of entity-level (as opposed to group-level) capital and liquidity requirements, or 
geographical ring-fencing, and the omission of geographical risk diversification inside the 
euro area in stress test scenarios, which are certainly not helpful in the context of the bank-
sovereign vicious circle. 
3. The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) is in place, but as mentioned above, has not yet 
been tested. Within the Single Resolution Board, the chair and executive members at the 
centre can press ahead for resolution measures even if the relevant national resolution 
authority (or authorities) are reluctant. But the complex decision-making structure is a 
shortcoming of the new SRM regime (Schoenmaker, 2015; Véron, 2015). Because of the 
involvement of the European Commission and the Council, decision-making can easily 
become protracted while time is of the essence in crisis management. Moreover, the process 
might become politicised, for example when ‘national banking champions’ are the subject of 
potential resolution measures. To close, or restructure, troubled banks with a firm hand, 
more distance from the political process would be desirable. The Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) is an example of a well-functioning agency with resolution powers in the 
US, but the SRB is not directly comparable in terms of independence and resources, let alone 
experience. 
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4. The European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS) was proposed by the European 
Commission on 24 November 2015, yet negotiations for it have stalled and we see little 
prospect for a break-through in the immediate future.  
5. Direct recapitalisation of banks by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is in principle 
possible, but is so much constrained by guidelines adopted in 2014 that it may never be 
used. The Single Resolution Fund is gradually paid-up by contributions from banks but its 
size remains limited (around EUR 10bn at the time of writing), and it still lacks a credible 
euro-area-wide backstop. As discussed in Section 3.2, a common backstop is crucial to 
achieve adequate risk-sharing within the banking union. 
Therefore, while a number of banking union-related factors that mitigate the bank-sovereign 
vicious circle, have been introduced and are effective, others are untested or have a remote 
prospect for completion. Still, in our assessment the BRRD regulation and the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism have already made major contributions to mitigate this “doom loop”. 
 
3.4 The start of Solvency II for insurers, 2016 
Traditionally, the focus of attention for both academics and policymakers concerned with 
financial stability is on banking. Nevertheless, insurance is also important for prudential 
supervision. In the literature, gross written premiums (GWP) are used as indicator for the 
geographical segmentation of insurance business. Cross-border insurance, measured by GWP, 
amounts to 36 percent of total GWP in EU countries in 2012, while the comparable number for 
banking, measured by assets, stands at 25 percent of total banking assets in EU countries (see 
Figure 2). Figure 10 shows the cross-border penetration for individual EU countries. The share of 
cross-border insurance has increased over the last decade, notwithstanding the global financial 
crisis (Schoenmaker and Sass, 2016). 
EIOPA, the European supervisory authority, plays a coordinating role among the national 
insurance supervisors (see Section 3.1). With the advance to Solvency II, the new risk-based 
capital framework for European insurers, this coordinating role of EIOPA has become even more 
important. First, EIOPA has a strong role in setting the technical standards underpinning 
Solvency II to ensure a level playing field. Second, EIOPA has an advisory role for the approval of 
internal models under Solvency II. But final authority rests with the national supervisors. The 
design and rollout of an (international) insurance group’s internal model are typically done at 
the head office, whereby the home country supervisor takes the lead. But the host country 
supervisor must approve the use of the internal model for the foreign subsidiaries in its 
jurisdiction. In case of disagreement among home and host supervisors in the so-called 
supervisory colleges, EIOPA has thus an advisory role, but the home supervisor has the final say 
(Schoenmaker and Sass, 2016).  
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The increasing share of cross-border insurance may tilt the supervisory balance from 
coordination towards centralisation in an “insurance union” at some future point. EIOPA would 
then be in charge of the supervisory colleges, just as the ECB oversees the Joint Supervisory 
Teams in the banking union. 
 
Figure 10: Share of total insurance premiums from foreign-owned branches and 
subsidiaries, 2012 
 
Notes: Cross-border penetration via branches and subsidiaries from EU and non-EU countries as 
percentage of total Gross Written Premium (GWP). Countries marked with an asterisk (*) are 
current members of the euro area. 
Source: Schoenmaker and Sass (2016) 
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4. Comparison of financial integration in Asia and in Europe 
A key difference between Asian and European economies is related to financial openness. Figure 
11 shows that in most European countries full capital account openness (as measured by the 
Chinn-Ito index) had been achieved by the early 1990s. The laggards were Greece (by 2002) and 
Cyprus (by 2008), related to their entry into the euro area. Germany had a fully open capital 
account already in 1970. Cyprus introduced capital controls in 2012, which is reflected in the 
index15. 
In contrast, while Hong Kong, Japan and Singapore opted for fully open capital accounts 
decades ago, capital flows are much more restricted in most Asian economies. Indonesia and 
Malaysia also opted for full capital account openness around 1990, but there were major and 
permanent setbacks around the 1997/98 Asian crisis. In the Republic of Korea, which is among 
the most developed nations in Asia, there were major restrictions to capital flows for decades 
(and a temporary setback after the 1997/98 crisis), and after the recent increase, openness 
remains inferior to the openness of European economies. 
 
                                                          
15 Greece also introduced capital controls in 2015, which is not yet visible, given that the Chinn-Ito index is 
available up to 2014. 
 31 
Figure 11: The Chinn-Ito index of capital account openness, selected European and Asian 
countries, 1970-2014 
 
Source: updated dataset of Chinn and Ito (2006), http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-Ito_website.htm  
 
Gross capital flows also tend to be much more significant in Europe than in Asia. Figure 12 
shows that in the four largest euro-area countries, gross capital inflows and outflows typically 
exceeded 10 percent of GDP annually, and in some years have exceeded even 20 percent of GDP. 
In contrast, in the six Asian countries reported in the chart, gross capital flows rarely exceeded 10 
percent of GDP16. 
                                                          
16 We also highlight that Figure 12 indicates the reversal of financial integration in Europe following the 
global and European financial crises of recent years. For example, ‘liabilities’ on the chart indicate capital 
flows related to non-residents. Negative values for liabilities flows indicate capital inflows by non-
residents, while positive values indicate the withdrawal of earlier inflows by non-residents. Before 2008, all 
liability flows were negative in Germany and Spain (and in most years in the cases of France and Italy), but 
after 2008 there were a number of years with withdrawals. Such withdrawals are also noticeable in 
Indonesia and Thailand after 1997. Similarly, flows related to assets indicate foreign investment by 
residents, which take positive values when investment is made abroad. But in a number of EU countries 
after 2008 flows related to assets took negative values, which shows that domestic investor withdraw their 
earlier foreign investments. 
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Figure 12: Gross capital flows: comparison of some European and Asia economies, 1989-
2015 
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Source: IMF Balance of Payments Statistics (capital flows) and World Economic Outlook database 
(GDP).  
Note: in line with the BOP6 manual, negative values indicate capital inflows into the country in 
question and positive values outflows from the country.  
 
The differences in the magnitudes of gross capital flows have led to even more significant 
differences in gross foreign assets and liabilities (Figure 13). In France, Germany and Spain, 
foreign assets and/or liabilities amount to about 200 percent of GDP, and in Italy they are about 
150 percent. In contrast, in Asian countries the shares of foreign liabilities tend to be smaller 
than 100 percent of GDP, and foreign assets are generally even much lower.  
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Figure 13: The stock of gross foreign assets and liabilities: comparison of some European 
and Asia economies 
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Source: IMF Balance of Payments Statistics (NIIP) and World Economic Outlook database (GDP). 
Note: NIIP = Net International Investment Position.  
 
A further indicator, foreign bank penetration, also suggests that Europe is much more integrated 
than Asia (Figure 13). This indicator is especially high in Emerging Europe, yet values for 
Western Europe are also well above Asian values.  
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Figure 14: Foreign bank penetration by region 
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on IMF International Financial Statistics and BIS 
Consolidated Banking Statistics. Note: Lending by foreign banks, as a percentage of total bank 
lending to non-banks in each country or region. The data are for the major countries and regions. 
In the case of regions, the data for the respective countries in that region are aggregated. 
 
To summarise, all indicators considered in this section suggest that financial openness and 
integration is much higher in Europe than in Asia. Increased political and trade integration, as 
well as harmonised EU-wide financial regulatory measures and the introduction of the euro 
have likely boosted financial integration. Full capital account openness (as a result of financial 
regulation) made possible the high level of financial integration. In contrast, beyond the 
increase in trade integration, the other factors were not at work in Asia. 
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5. Lessons from European financial integration for regional financial regulatory 
and supervisory architecture and cooperation in Asia 
Asia is much less financially integrated than Europe, and there is no comparable political and 
legal integration in Asia. Therefore, expectations about possible regional financial regulatory 
and supervisory cooperation in Asia have to be realistic; the long process of European regulatory 
and supervisory integration is unlikely to be followed in Asia under foreseeable circumstances. 
Yet we see three main areas in which Asian policymakers could draw lessons from European 
experiences: (1) the need for a harmonised micro-prudential framework, (2) macro-prudential 
structures and (3) Asian participation in global financial authorities. 
 
5.1 A harmonised micro-prudential framework 
The overview of European financial integration in this paper suggests that the starting point for 
financial policy convergence, with a view towards financial system integration, is a harmonised 
framework of rules and regulations. A sound basis is provided by international standard setters, 
such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) or the International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO). Asian countries are now well represented in the membership of these international 
bodies. But global standards are often not specific enough to satisfy the requirements of a 
genuine supranational 'single rulebook'.  
Europe has stepped up regulatory harmonisation further in a regional setting under the 
leadership of the European Commission, with an increasingly significant role for specialised 
agencies (the three European Supervisory Authorities: EBA, EIOPA and ESMA) and other 
European-level participants such as the ECB for banking policy. Increased harmonisation has 
allowed national supervisors to increase the scope for mutual recognition.  
Efforts at regulatory harmonisation and mutual recognition in Asia should of course take into 
account the realities of the region. At this point, it appears more realistic to envisage a web of 
bilateral or multilateral 'equivalency' frameworks than a fully-fledged sector-wide system of 
supranational rulemaking. For example, if a bank or insurer is supervised under ‘equivalent’ 
rules, the host country could accept incoming business from banks and insurers supervised in 
other relevant Asian countries. Such a system of harmonisation and mutual recognition may 
help financial integration, while minimising compliance costs for banks with cross-border 
operations. Further steps in the financial regulatory and supervisory architecture might follow 
the specific patterns of financial integration among financial institutions and markets in Asia. 
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5.2 A proper macro-prudential framework 
There is a growing recognition that healthy individual financial institutions are a necessary 
condition, but are not sufficient to ensure stability of the financial system, which has led to 
renewed interest in macro-prudential policies.  
A potential limitation of macro-prudential tools is that they can be subject to regulatory 
arbitrage, either by provoking greater cross-border borrowing (Cerutti et al, 2015) or by 
migration of activities from banks to the shadow-banking sector (Cizel et al, 2016). A case in 
point is the application of loan-to-value (LTV) ratios to mortgages. While most countries 
traditionally apply such LTV restrictions to banks, mortgages are also offered to retail clients by 
insurers and pension funds. It is thus important that such measures be applied across the 
financial system (ESRB, 2016).  
Given that the shadow-banking sector has become one of the main sources of systemic risk, one 
of the main challenges in the next few years will be to find instruments that have an impact on 
the bank-like activities of non-banks. For instance, in the US, the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act widened 
the remit of the Federal Reserve, allowing supervisors from the newly created Financial Stability 
Oversight Council (FSOC) to oversee non-bank financial institutions that they deem to be 
systemically important. In Europe, the creation of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) in 
2010 and the delegation of some macro-prudential authority to the ECB under the SSM 
Regulation were beneficial, in our view. However, possibly because of diverging national 
interests, macro-prudential supervision is awkwardly shared between the ECB, ESRB, and 
national authorities. As highlighted by Darvas and Merler (2013), the ECB can only apply those 
tools in order to seek to influence lenders’ behaviour, as categorised by Blanchard et al (2013), 
but cannot apply tools aimed at controlling borrowers’ behaviour, such as LTV and debt-to-
income (DTI) ratios. These latter tools remain in the hands of national authorities. The ECB's 
limited remit might well be the weakness of the institutional arrangement, but the practice of 
macro-prudential policies will show if this limitation is severe or if cooperation between the ECB 
and national authorities, under the watch of the ESRB, ensures the proper implementation of 
the various macro-prudential tools. 
A key lesson for Asia is therefore the need for a proper macro-prudential framework to increase 
the resilience of the financial system, to dampen the financial cycle and to stem undue capital 
flows. Such efforts can also build on the experiences of several of Asian countries with the 
adoption of such tools. As Posen and Véron (2015) argues, macroprudential tools can be more 
effective in less open or less financially deep economies than in more advanced financial 
centres. 
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5.3 Asian participation in global authorities 
Last but not least, Asian countries could push for further rebalancing and empowerment of 
global financial standard-setters and authorities (such as the Basel Committee, Financial 
Stability Board or IOSCO) in order to foster greater convergence at the global level, from which 
Asia stands to benefit disproportionately. As documented by Véron (2014), Asia is now 
reasonably represented in the membership of most such global bodies, but not so in their 
leadership (let alone their geographical location, which remains overwhelmingly European and 
to a lesser extent North American). Even in terms of membership, further adjustments are 
desirable: for example, with the advent of banking union, it is no longer justified that authorities 
from individual euro-area countries (namely Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, and Spain) continue as full members of the Basel Committee in addition to the 
ECB and SSM. A system of global bodies with more balanced representation of stakeholder 
jurisdictions may in turn be given a stronger mandate to set more specific standards, to better 
monitor their implementation, or even in some cases to directly or indirectly supervise relevant 
market participants with a global footprint. The EU experience illustrates how a vision of 
supranational regulation and even of supranational supervision could move from being utopian 
to being realistic in a matter of a few years: as recently as a decade ago, the very notion of 
supranational financial supervision in Europe was typically dismissed as a pipe dream, but it is 
now up and running. While the specific circumstances of the European Union have no 
equivalent in Asia, Asians might draw inspiration from this experience to consider proactive 
initiatives to compensate for recent failures of leadership of Europe and the United States, and to 
promote a more coherent and credible international framework for the effective oversight of an 
increasingly integrated global financial system.  
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7. Abbreviations 
BCBS: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
BIS: Bank for International Settlements 
BRRD: Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive 
BU: (European) Banking Union 
CDS: credit default swap 
CEBS: Committee of European Banking Supervisors 
CEIOPS: Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors 
CESR: Committee of European Securities Regulators 
CMU: (European) Capital Markets Union 
CRD: Capital Requirements Directive 
DTI: debt-to-income ratio 
EBA: European Banking Authority 
ECB: European Central Bank 
EDIS: European deposit insurance scheme 
EIOPA: European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority 
EP: European Parliament 
ESAs: European Supervisory Authorities 
ESC: European Securities Committee 
ESFS: European System of Financial Supervisors 
ESMA: European Securities and Markets Authority 
ESRB: European Systemic Risk Board 
EU: European Union 
FDIC: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
FSAP: Financial Services Action Plan (note: in the IMF’s terminology, FSAP stands for Financial 
Sector Assessment Program)  
FSB: Financial Stability Board 
FSOC: Financial Stability Oversight Council 
GWP: gross written (insurance) premiums 
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IAIS: International Association of Insurance Supervisors  
IAIS: International Association of Insurance Supervisors 
IFRS: International Financial Reporting Standards 
IOSCO: International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
JSTs: Joint Supervisory Teams  
LTV: loan-to-value ratio 
MiFID: the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive  
NPL: non-performing loans 
NSA: National Supervisory Authority 
SREP: Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process 
SRF: Single Resolution Fund 
SRM: Single Resolution Mechanism 
SSM: Single Supervisory Mechanism 
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